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JAMi^S E. TRAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF R E S P O ^ O F v r

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 0¥ THE CASE
The appellant, James E. Travis, appeals from a conviction of 'the crime of robbei} entered against him in
the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE I X)WER CO! JRT
i lie appellant "was found guilty t yf r *bb< r\ by a jury
and was sentenced to eetrve in the I :«ii- SI.-N !>rison
for the indeterminate teams of 1-15 vev>
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the verdict and judgment rendered by the jury at the
trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent agrees with appellant's Statement of
Facts with the following additions and corrections:
1. The evidence offered by the State also showed
that:
a. Appellant kicked one of the victims and said,
"Don't move and don't stick your heads up because we
have a gun and we'll blow your heads off" (Tr. 108, 130,
2nd day);
b. Mr. LaVoy, a bystander who witnessed the crime,
testified that two people got out of a blue 1962 Impala
with green license plates and white lettering, walked side
by side to the lounge, exited carrying a money bag, and
drove quickly away (Tr. 142, 143, 1st day);
d. Appellant and Mr. Kendricks did not have a
verbal or physical exchange between them (Tr. 117-121,
1st day; 107-108, 2nd day).
2. On cross-examination appellant admitted (a)
that the codefendant's reasons for returning to the bar
did not make any sense (Tr. 242, 2nd day); (b) that
he did not know when the appellant took the wallets and
money of the victims (Tr. 248, 2nd day); (c) that the
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money bag containing the currency was ripped open and
discarded from the car in which appellant was riding before appellant apparently knew a robbery had been, committed (Tr. 253, 2nd day; 287, 3rd day),
-i. In denying defense counsel's motion to call appellant's codefendanit as a witness, the court relied on the
case of State v, Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P. 2d
689, cert, denied, 368 U. S. 922, 82 S. Ot. 246, 7 L. Ed.
2d 137 (1960), and that such opportunity was unethical
because the only effect that the tesitimony could have
had upon the jury was to show that appellant's codefemcl ; lit was the perpetrator of the crime (Tr, 210, 2nd day;
278-277, 3rd day). .
4. In denying defense counsel's motion to introduce
an affidavit of appellant's oodefendant the court rejected,
appellant's argument that Rule 43IIM >>f the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and Rules 63(2) and WHO) of the
Utah Rules of Evidence allowed Ui<* in i reduction of such
an affidavit in a criminal proMrh:- ARGUMK.VI
FOIM '
T H E

T R ] [ A L

C 0 U R T

F 0 L L 0 W E D

rj^

PROPER PROCEDURE BY DENYING APPELLANT THE RIGHT TO CALL HIS CODEFENDANT AS A WITNESS WHEN THE
CODEFENDANT INVOKED HIS PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
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Appellant was convicted of robbery under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953), as amended, which provides:
"(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate
presence, against his will, accomplished by
means of iawe or fear.
U

(2)
gree."

Robbery is a felony of the second de-

The fact that the basic elements of the crime of
robbery were committed is not disputed by appellant.
Appellant's contention is that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by refusing to allow the appellant to
call his codefendant as a witness when the codefendant
testified that he would invoke his privilege against selfincrimination. Respondent contends that (1) the admissibility of the codefendant's testimony lies within
the discretion of the trial court; (2) the voir dire examination of the witness out of the piresence of the jury to
determine whether the witness intended to invoke his
Fifth Amendment privilege against sdf-incrimination
was the proper procedure in deciding whether to prohibit
the witness from being called to testify; and (3) the
practicality of this position is substantiated by the great
weight of policy considerations.
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) provides:
"Except as in these rules otherwise proDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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vided, the judge may in his discretion exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the risk that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial dangers
of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or
of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and
harmfully surprise a party who has not had
reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such
evidence would be offered."
As the note following this rule points out, the power of
the trial court to exclude certain evidence is necessary
for the orderly and efficient trial procedure. Rule 45^
U. R, E. (1971). In the present case the trial count
found that the admission of the codefendant's testimony
would create substantial danger of undue prejudice in
his later trial. In addition, the codefendant testified during voir dire examination that he intended to invoke his
privilege against self-inoriminatiion if he were called to
the stand and questioned about this incident (Tr. 208209, 2nd day). Therefore!, the trial court was justified
in finding that the attempt to examine the codefendant
would necessitate an undue consumption of time as well
as create undue prejudice for the codefendant in his
later severed trial.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares in part that "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." In Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486487, 71 S. Ct. 814, 818, 75 L. Ed. 1118, 1124 (1951), the
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Supreme Court enunciated the standard for measuring
when a witness may properly claim his right againsit
self ^crimination and thus refuse to respond to questioning:
"To sustain the privilege, it need only be
evident from the implications of the question,
in the setting in which it was asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be
dangerous because injurious disclosure could result."
In that case the Court held that the witness could invoke his privilege against self-incrimination where the
answers to certain questions could have linked him with
a federal crime.
The Hoffman Court also indicated, however,, that
a simple blanket declaration by the witness that he could
not testify for fear of self-incrimination without a determination of its sufficiency, would not suffice to invoke
the privilege. 341 U. S. at 486. Accordingly, the custom
is for the trial judge to examine the protesting witness
out of the presence of the jury in order to determine
the validity of his claim. Once the court satisfies itself
that the claim is well-grounded as to the testimony desired, it may, in its discretion, decline to permit either
party to place the witness on the stand for the purpose
of eliciting a claim of privilege or to comment on this
circumstance. United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F. 2d
1213 (5th Cir. 1975).
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In United States v. Lacouture, 495 F. 2d 1237, reh.
denied, 495 F. 2d 1241 (5rtih Cir. 1974), where the witness
after extensive examination before the court in chambers, advised the court that on her attorney's advice
she would invoke the Fifth Amendment, the court held
that if it appeared a witness intended to claim the privilege as to essentially all questions, the court could, in
its discretion, refuse to allow the witness to take the
stand. In Commonwealth v. Roukas, Mass. App., 313
N. E. 2d 143 (1974), where a witness was excused following a voir dire examination in which he declined to
answer questions on the ground that his answers might
tend to incriminate him, the court held that the trial
court's decision to hold a voir dire examination was a
proper exercise of sound judicial discretion. These decisions hold that the voir dire examination of the witness
was not only within the discretion of the trial court but
that it was sound judicial discretion to follow such a
procedure. Indeed, in Gomez-Rojas, supra, the most recent decision dealing with this issue, where the witness
informed the trial judge that he could not testify for
fear of self-incrimination, and the judge without a hearing, accepted the witness' claim, the court held that the
trial judge erred in that he did not hold a hearing to
determine whether the witness' fears of self-incrimination were well founded.
A case very much resembling the facts of the present case is State v. Toliver, 5 Wash. App. 321, 487 P.
2d 264 (1971), where an attorney representing the ap-
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pellent's burglary accomplice objected to the introduction of the accomplice's testimony on the ground that
there was danger of self-incrimination, which privilege
the witness subsequently asserted in his own behalf.
The court held that if the question prima facie appeared
to be incriminatory, the witness was the sole judge of
whether the answer in fact inmminated him, and thus
the witness' objection was upheld. The court relied
heavily on the trial court's knowledge that the accomplice
was awaiting trial out of charges arising from the same
burglaries with which the appellant was charged. Id. at
269. Similarly, in State v. Bell, 112 N. H. 444, 298 A. 2d
753 (1972), where a juvenile witness testified in chambers that he intended to follow defense counsel's advice
and claim the privilege against self-incrimiination whenever "they asked anything about me," the court held
that, after carefully questioning a witness^ if it appeared
that ther was no relevant nonprivileged testimony which
the witness could have offered, there was no error in excusing the witness from further testifying. The present
case clearly falls within the standard of Toliver, supra,
and the trial court recognized that pending charges
against appellant's codefendant created a prima facie
case of incrimination. Nevertheless, the trial court asked
the codefendant whether he would claim the Fifth
Amendment if questioned at all about the incident, to
which the codefendant answered that he would (Tr.
208-209, 2nd day). In Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App.
508, 313 A. 2d 847 (1974), where appellant's witness
agreed with his attorney in the judge's chambers that
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he would refuse to give testimony concerning a certain
day's activities on the ground that it might tend to incriminate him and during voir dire examination of the
witness outside of the presence of the jury the witness
reiterated his firm resolve to invoke the privilege as to
all questions concerning activities of that day, the trial
judge even informed the jury that the witness had been
called by the defendant and invoked his privilege against
self4ncriminatijon, which did not occur in the present
case, and the court still held there was nothing improper
in the actions of the trial court.
A common argument against the procedure of the
trial court concerns the reliability of the inferences that
can be drawn from a witness who invokes the privilege
againsit self-incrimination. In Lacouture, supra, the court
rejects this argument since the inferences that can be
found in favor of the prosecution and the defense are
equal. 495 F. 2d at 1240. In State v. Miller, 6 Or. App.
366, 487 P. 2d 1387 (1971), where appellant's codefendant in a murder trial claimed his privilege against selfincrimination out of the presence of the jury, and made
it clear he would continue to do so, the court held that
it was not improper for the trial court to refuse to require the codefendant to testify even if he would have
only claimed his privilege against self-incrimination. The
court rejected the argument that speculation in the minds
of the jurors would be caused when the codefendant did
not testify because if the codefendant had taken the witness stand he would have claimed the privilege and the
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jury could have been left in a state of speculation anyway. Id. at 1390.
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in
not investigating the valid scope of the codefendant's
privilege. As discussed above, many courts recognize that
such a detailed investigation is unnecessary in a situation
like the present case where a codefendant invokes the
privilege as to all questions in order to protect his own
later severed trial. In United States v. Wilcox, 450 F.
2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1971), where the district judge knew
of the witness' testimony at a previous trial and was
aware that counsel had advised the witness that there
were other offenses for which he could be prosecuted,
the court held that the district judge was not required
to conduct a factually detailed inquiry before permitting
the witness to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. The court noted that in effect the judge would be
asking whether the witness had lied in the first trial,
an affirmative answer to which would have formed a link
in the chain of possible future prosecutions. Id. at 1140.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED THE
PROPER PROCEDURE BY DENYING APPELLANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTRODUCE INTO EVIDENCE THE CODEFENDANT'S PRIOR AFFIDAVIT.
In denying defense counsel's motion to introduce an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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affidavit of appellant's codefendant, made during the
course of testimony on the motion to sever, the court
rejected the appellant's argument that Rule 43(e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1953), and Rule
63(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), which allow
an affidavit to be admitted in civil proceedings as an
exception to the hearsay rule, also allowed the introduction of such an affidavit in this criminal prosecution (Tr.
278-279, 3rd day). The note following the rule states
that the reason for the affidavit exception is to provide
substantial compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In addition the prior statement made by appellant's
codefendant was given with the assurance that the statement would not be used in violation of the codefendant's
privilege against self-incidmination. The following dialogue occurred between the trial judge and the attorney
for the codefendant during the course of the motion to
sever when the judge requested that the codefendant
testify under oath:
"MR. HOUSELY: Your Honor, first of all, it
is my understanding it would not be a waiver
of the right not to take the stand?
THE COURT: Certainly not. This isn't part
of the trial.
MR. HOUSELY: It wouldn't be a waiver of
the right to give evidence against himself if he
is called as a witness in a subsequent bearing?
For example, if my witness were called against
Travis in a subsequent proceeding, then he
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would still retain his right against self-incriminatdon?
THE COURT: Yes. We will run the trial according to the Constitution. It guarantees
that." (Tr. 334).
On the basis that the testimony would not be used
in violation of has privilege against self-incrimination, the
codefendant consented to testify. At the time of appellant's trials the trial judge recognized that the codefendant's testimony could have had an incriminating effect
upon his own separate trial and therefore, in accordance
with the standard procedure followed by the great weight
of authorities discussed above, properly dismissed the
codefendant from testifying. It seems senseless indeed
to sustain the codefendant's privilege against self-incrimination and then admit the same evidence by way of
affidavit, particularly when the testimony was given on
the premise that it would not be used in violation of the
codefendant's Fifth Amendment privilege. In accordance
with this reasoning, the cases cited by the appellant are
distinguishable from the present case since the prior
testimony in those cases was given at a prior trial or
preliminary hearing, and not during a motion to sever
where the trial judge and counsel agreed that such testimony would not constitute a waiver of the codefendant's
Fifth Amendment rights.
Respondent contends that in order for the affidavit
to have been admitted into evidence, if it could have
been admitted into evidence, in a criminal proceeding,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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it was necessary for appellant to prove that the codefendant did not properly invoke his privilege during the
motion to sever or during the trial of the appellant. During the testimony taken during the motion to sever, although not under trial circumstances, appellant made
no objection to the judge's decision that the testimony
would not be produced in a later proceeding against the
codefendant's privilege. Moreover, the appellant's objection to the procedure of the court during the trial has
been shown to lack merit, in accordance with the custom
and standard of the majority of courts under Pbint I
above.
Appellant also contends that the testimony is admissible under Rule 63(10) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), as a declaration against interest. Respondent
contends that this Rule is "subject to the limitations of
Rule 63(6)" of the Rules of Evidence (1971), which
provides that such previous statement is admissible "if,
and only if, . . . the circumstances under which the
statement was made were not violative of the constitutional rights of the accused." Clearly, in accordance with
the agreement during the motion to sever and in accordance with the determinations made by the trial judge
at the time of trial, introduction of the codefendant's
prior testimony was violative of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
Nevertheless, if the court finds that the procedure
followed by the trial court, in not allowing the codefendant or his testimony to be presented before the jury,
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was error, was the error harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. In State v. Bell, supra, where the court found no
error in the procedure of the trial court, the court held
that even if the procedure had been improper, it was
harmless error since prejudice to the defendant must be
established in order to constitute reversible error. 298
A. 2d at 757. There was no prejudice to the appellant
in the present case since the testimony of the codefendant during the motion to sever was of no significance
and the evidence presented by the prosecution during
the trial proved that a robbery was committed and appellant was one of the persons who committed the crime.
The codefendant's testimony during the motion to
sever established that (a) appellant did not come into
the bar until fighting had commenced between the codefendant and the bartender; (b) the appellant did not
discuss the money bags with the codefendant; and (c)
the appellant was hit by the codefendant (Tr. 338-339).
In addition, the codefendant actually implicated the
appellant by stating that he, as one of three possibilities,
could have picked up the green money bag containing
the money belonging to the bar and a driver's license of
one of the victims which was later found in the automobile (Tr. 239-240).
At the trial the evidence presented by the prosecution showed that: (a) appelant and his codefendant
entered the lounge together and pushed the victims
down on the floor (Tr. 116-118, 1st day; 124-125, 2nd
day); (b) appellant and his codefendant forcibly took the
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victims' wallets, money, and other personal belongings,
and then took money belonging to the business located
in a money bag and cash register behind the bar counter
(Tr. 119-121, 1st day; 126-129, 2nd day); (c) appellant
and his codefendant did not have a verbal or physical
exchange between them (Tr. 117-121, 1st day; 107-106,
2nd day); (d) two persons left the lounge together carrying a money bag (Tr. 143,1st day); (e) Mr. Zancanella
told the police he had been robbed (Tr. 144, 1st day);
(f) appellant, his codefendant, and Miss Rewe were*
later apprehended with various rolls of coins,, sacks,
and personal items belonging to the victims and the
lounge (Tr. 174-183, 191-194, 2nd day); (g) at the place
place of apprehension, Mr. Zancanella identified appellant and his codefendant as the men who had robbed
him (Tr. 124, 1st day). In addition, a bystander testified that two people got out of a blue 1962 Impala with
green license plates and white lettering, went together
into the lounge, exited carrying a money bag, and drove
quickly away (Tr. 142-144, 1st day). Furthermore, the
appellant was apprehended within minutes after the robbery had taken place while in the process of leaving the
State of Utah (Tr. 155-157, 2nd day). This evidence was
clearly sufficient, with or without the testimony of appellant's codefendant for the jury to find that a robbery
had been committed and appellant was one of the persons who committed the crime. Therefore, the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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CONCLUSION
Because the procedure of the trial court was proper,
in allowing appellant's codefendant to invoke his privilege against selfninCTinunation and not allowing the appellant to introduce a prior affidavit of the codefendant
in violation of the codefendant's privilege, and any error
that could have been committed was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, appellant's rights during the trial were
not prejudiced. Therefore, respondent respectfully submits that appellant's request for a new trial be denied
and that the verdict and judgment of the jury at the
trial be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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